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What is best strategy to reach the Millennium Development Goal of basic 
education for all will depend on the specific country context. This paper introduces an 
input-output method to estimate the financial inputs required to achieve the MDG for 
primary education and an additional target of enhancing access to secondary 
education.
1 As such the approach followed here is not new, but the innovative element 
is combining educational demand and supply variables considering both cost 
dimensions and quality of services as measured among others through test scores 
(outcomes), quality of school inputs and the nature of delivery of services (private-
public, centralized or decentralized). We take the following analytical steps: (i) define 
a production function for specific education outputs (enrolment), (ii) isolate the main 
determinants of such output (considering both demand and supply factors); (iii) 
estimate costs per unit of producing such output, and – based on estimated elasticity’s 
and unit costs ensuing from the education production function – (iv) calculate the 
financing needs of reaching key education goals.  We find that determinants of access 
to schooling are significantly different for urban and rural and for poor and non-poor 
children. Furthermore, the determinants also differ when referring to access to 
primary or secondary education. Quality of school inputs does matter in all cases 
though to varying degree. Particularly, class size, shares of trained teachers and 
greater school autonomy (in hiring teachers and managing schools) are relevant. 
Quality of education outcomes, i.e. test scores, while very poor in Ecuador does not 
seem to influence school enrolment. The upshot is that with a more cost-effective use 
of resources for primary education, the MDG target of 100% of net primary school 
enrolment in urban areas is within reach in a period of 4 to 5 years at virtually no 
additional budgetary cost. Meeting the target for the rural population seems more 
complicated. In secondary education, important progress can be made to reach a target 
of 70% net enrolment (with important expected positive externalities for economic 
growth) by enhancing the share of trained teachers, expand coverage of school 
demand subsidies and improve class infrastructure. This target is within reach for the 
poor and non-poor urban population by 2007 at an estimated additional cost of 
                                                 
1 Vos is with the Institute of Social Studies (ISS), The Hague and the Free University Amsterdam. 
Ponce is with FLACSO-Ecuador and is also a PhD candidate at ISS. Correspondence address: 
vos@iss.nl. We are grateful to Arjun Bedi for his contributions and advice to parts of the research 
presented here and for helpful comments on a previous version of this paper. 
 between 0.1 and 0.6% of GDP, depending on alternative cost-effectiveness 
considerations. Reaching the 70% target for the rural population will require a much 




1  INTRODUCTION....................................................................................................1 
2  ECUADOR’S EDUCATIONAL PERFORMANCE IN THE 1990S......................2 
3  TRENDS IN EDUCATION EXPENDITURES.......................................................4 
4  COST-EFFECTIVENESS OF EDUCATION SPENDING.....................................8 
4.1  Modeling the access to schooling..................................................................10 
4.2  Empirical specification..................................................................................11 
4.3  Empirical results............................................................................................12 
4.4  Cost-effectiveness in primary education.......................................................14 
4.5  Cost-effectiveness in secondary education....................................................18 
5  BUDGET IMPLICATIONS OF TRYING TO ACHIEVE EDUCATION 
TARGETS ..............................................................................................................20 
5.1  Budget tracking and projections for primary education................................22 





The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) include the target of reaching 
basic education for all by 2015. A recent study by Sachs et al. (2004) for 5 developing 
countries estimates the additional annual cost of reaching this MDG between US$ 12 
and 18 in per capita terms. The similarity in the estimate range of these costs is 
remarkable, given important differences in initial conditions in educational 
performance of the set of low-income countries (Bangladesh, Cambodia, Ghana, 
Tanzania, and Uganda). Noteworthy, in the key, cost-effective budget scenario for 
Ecuador, a middle-income country, we estimate the additional annual cost for 
reaching primary education for all at about US$ 5 in per capita terms. Thus it seems 
hard to assume that there exist stylized facts about the required costs to reach the 
MDG for education. Rather, we expect that more likely the range will be much wider 
across different country contexts. What are the more cost-effective options will differ 
from country to country, as much as that financing gaps are likely smaller in countries 
which are already close to reaching the MDG than those with large deficiencies in 
access to primary education. More country studies are needed to shed light on this 
issue. 
This study tries to contribute with a cost-effectiveness analysis for both 
primary and secondary education in Ecuador. The Ecuadorian government spends 
more on education than on any other public sector program. Ecuador has good 
coverage of primary education, but its quality is poor and transition to secondary 
education is low. Also inequality in access to education has increased between urban 
and rural population groups and between rich and poor. Only the gender gap in 
education appears to be by and large closed. The present government is committed to 
the MDGs as well as to improve management of education by distributing resources 
based on school age population, improve school access through targeted subsidy 
schemes, and shifting towards a more decentralized provisioning of education 
services. These priorities are partly based on the findings of this study. The reason to 
extend the analysis to secondary education is not merely given by already fairly high 
net enrolment rates for primary education. Analyses of rates of return to education for 
Ecuador and labour market studies show that deficient supply of workers with 
secondary education are a key factor in widening gaps between skilled and unskilled 
workers and a loss of competitiveness of Ecuador’s industries after its process of 
  1 
economic opening that started around 1990 (see Vos and Ponce 2004; and Vos and 
León 2003a). 
The cost-effectiveness analysis in this study is based on the basic model of 
determinants of access to schooling (see e.g. Gertler and Glewwe 1990; Glewwe 
1999), but instead of mainly focusing on demand factors such as income, the cost of 
education and socio-economic conditions of the households and children in school 
going age, we consider in addition (a) supply factors, and more in particular the 
quality of schooling inputs (as in e.g. Glewwe 1999); and (b) institutional aspects of 
the delivery of educational services (like centralized or decentralized teacher 
appointments). This modeling framework allows us to assess both demand and supply 
factors in identifying cost-effective interventions after linking the core determinants 
of access primary and secondary school to unit costs and integrating these into a 
results-oriented budget tracking model. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we 
summarize the performance of Ecuador’s education system during the 1990s up to the 
early 2000s, looking at outcome indicators. Section 3 analyses the trends in the level 
and composition of education spending, quality of schooling inputs, and equity issues 
in the public expenditure pattern. In section 4 we analyze the determinants of access 
to primary and secondary education to inform more cost-effective uses of the 
education budget. These findings are subsequently used in section 5 for a scenario 
analysis of alternative education budget allocations aiming at reaching the Millennium 
Development Goals in education. This budget analysis also sets out the parameters for 
an education budget tracking system which should allow the government to prepare 
result-oriented, multi-annual budgets. Measuring outputs and outcomes will provide 
information to fine tune the public quality and effectiveness of provision of education 




2  ECUADOR’S EDUCATIONAL PERFORMANCE IN THE 1990s 
Educational indicators for Ecuador have continued to improve during the 
1990s and into the first decade of the new millennium. In comparison to previous 
decades though, the speed of educational improvement has slowed down and 
educational inequality has grown in many respects, except for the gender gap in 
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education which by and large has been closed. We detail several educational outcome 
indicators in this section. 
The average level of schooling of the Ecuadorian population has increased 
continuously since the 1970s. According to the population census of 2001, the 
average Ecuadorian adult had 7.3 years of schooling completed, up from 6.7 years in 
1990. Ecuador’s average schooling level is above that of the Latin American mean 
and about the same as that of East Asia’s population. Educational levels of the female 
population have risen much faster than that of males, such that by 2001 the gender 
gap in terms of years of schooling has practically been closed: 7.5 years for males 
against 7.1 years for females. In terms of net enrolment rates, girls already outperform 
boys at all educational levels (see table 1). Total net enrolment in primary education 
increased from 88.9 to 90.1% between 1990 and 2001 (according to population census 
data), approximating the Millennium Development Goal of primary education for all. 
 
TABLE 1 
Ecuador: Illiteracy rate and years of schooling of adult population (25 yrs and older) 










SECUNDARY   
1990 2001 1990 2001  1990 2001  1990  2001 
BY GENDER                     
Men  9.5 7.7 7.1 7.5 88.6  89.9  42.0  43.9 
Women  13.8  10.3 6.3 7.1 89.2  90.4  44.1  45.4 
BY AREA                         
Rural  20.8  15.5 4.0 4.9 84.4  86.7  23.2  28.8 
Urban  6.1 5.3 8.3 8.7 92.5  92.7  57.7  55.7 
BY ETHNIC GROUP                        
Indigenous n.a.  28.2  n.a. 3.3  n.a.  86.1 n.a.  22.7 
Blacks n.a.  11.6  n.a.  5.9 n.a.  86.2  n.a. 36.9 
Other  n.a. 7.4  n.a. 7.6 n.a.  90.8  n.a. 47.1 
NATIONAL AVERAGE  11.7  9.0  6.7 7.3  88.9  90.1 43.1  44.7 
 
 
This relatively favorable educational performance comes with a number of 
important qualifications.
2  First, the speed of educational performance has slowed 
down significantly during the 1990s as compared to the 1970s and 1980s (Vos, León 
                                                 
2 See Vos and Ponce (2004) for a more detailed assessment. This is assessment formed part of the 
Public Expenditure Review conducted by the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank 
(World Bank and IDB 2004). 
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and Ramírez 2003). Second, the transition rates from primary to secondary education 
and from secondary to tertiary education are low and have not improved in any 
significant degree during the 1990s. Third, except for the gender gap, important 
disparities remain and by several measures educational inequality has been on the rise. 
The average level of schooling of the rural population is almost half that of the urban 
population (4.9 against 8.7 years) and this gap remained about the same during the 
1990s. Fourth, the quality of education as measured by acquired knowledge is poor. 
The little information available on test scores shows that students are on average 




Ecuador: Test scores for language and mathematics skills, 
1996-2000 
    1996 1997 2000 
Second grade          
Spanish language skills  10.43  8.24  9.45 
Mathematics  9.33 7.21 8.48 
           
Sixth grade          
Spanish language skills  11.15  9.31  9.78 
Mathematics  7.17 4.86 6.03 
           
Ninth grade          
Spanish language skills  12.86  11.17  11.70 
Mathematics  7.29 5.35 6.01 
Source: APRENDO. 
Notes: Test scores are on a scale of 20 with 13 considered as the pass grade. 




3  TRENDS IN EDUCATION EXPENDITURES 
Social expenditure levels are low in Ecuador compared to other Latin 
American countries, both as a share of GDP and on a per-capita basis (see Vos 2003). 
Real expenditures per capita have fallen more or less continuously over the past two 
decades. Ecuador spent approximately 4-5 percent of GDP (or on average about US$ 
55 per capita) on the social sectors during the 1990s, compared to a Latin American 
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average of 12 percent (or US$ 550 per capita).
3 The per-capita figure for Ecuador 
improves to approximately US$ 130, or around 9% of GDP, when social security 
benefits are included. However, pensions are paid only to those retiring from jobs in 
the formal sector and mostly do not reach the poorer segments of society.
4 Real per 
capita social expenditure has fallen staggeringly since the early 1980s, and, although 
there has been a visible recovery since 2000, it currently stands below levels reached a 
quarter of a century ago (see figure 1). 
 
FIGURE 1 
Real social and public education spending per capita, 1973-2004 
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Source: Vos et al. (2003); updated for 2001-3 from Ministry of Economy-UNICEF fiscal data base.  
Public expenditures refer to central government budget only. Social expenditures include education, 
health, and social assistance (including cash transfer programs). 
 
The decline in social expenditures has hit hardest on education and health 
spending. During the 1990s, the composition of social spending shifted in favor of 
targeted social protection programs (including the introduction of the cash transfer 
program Bono Solidario) and further against budgets for universal social services in 
                                                 
3 Figures are in constant US dollars of 1997 as reported in ECLAC (2001) and, for Ecuador as estimated by 
Vos, León and Ramírez (2003). Data refer to spending by the central government only and do not include 
social security. 
4 This observation needs some qualification though as, after the 1999 crises, the real value of pension 
benefits plunged and financial assets of pensioners were decimated, turning many elderly into ‘new 
poor’. 
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education and health. Between 2001 and 2003, education and health budgets increased 
significantly, mainly due to various rounds of salary increases for teachers and 
medical personnel in public service. Despite the recovery in recent years, by 2003 the 
real level of educational spending was forty percent below that of 1980. 
How have educational services been affected by the decline in real public 
spending?
5 First, there could have been a shift in the structure of education spending, 
e.g. from more expensive tertiary to cheaper primary education. While we do not have 
consistent series by level of education for the 1990s, the available indicators for 1995-
2002 suggest the shares of public spending by level have remained more or less 
constant with around 37% going to pre-primary and primary education, 37% to 
secondary and about 26% to higher education. Second, a shift towards private 
provisioning could be another reason of reduced public spending. Private school 
supply indeed expanded during the 1980s and 1990s, but private sector coverage in 
terms of primary and secondary school enrolment is currently no more than 23% and 
this share has remained unchanged since 1996. Hence, if anything, at best a reduced 
portion of the decline of educational expenditure can be attributed to a shift to private 
education. Third, school inputs may have deteriorated. Looking at student/teacher 
ratios in primary and secondary education, however, it appears that Ecuador scores 
rather favorably in comparison with other countries in the region and probably 
internationally and these ratios have improved during the 1990s: for primary 
education from 30 to 23 students per teacher and secondary from 13 to 11.
6 In other 
words, it seems hard to sustain that the fundamental cause in the declining trend in 
education expenditures (or the deterioration of the quality of education for that matter) 
lies with a lack of numbers of teachers. 
More likely, the burden of the decline in education expenditure has fallen on 
the availability and quality of school infrastructure. While not easy to read from 
publicly available fiscal data, there seems to have been a decline in investment in new 
                                                 
5 It would have been better to present the trend in education spending per student rather than per capita. 
However, for the reasons explained in the previous footnotes it is not possible to construct a consistent 
series for more than a few years in the 1990s and 2000s, given the lack of coherence in the breakdown 
over time of fiscal data by levels of education. 
6 These input indicators compare favourably to the rest of the region, particularly for secondary 
education. In Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Peru, for instance, the ratio is over 20 at this level. 
The ratio at the primary level is similar to that of neighbouring countries with the exception perhaps for 
Chile which has a pupil/teacher ratio of 31 in primary education (comparison based on UNESCO data). 
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school infrastructure and provisioning for maintenance of existing schools. Much of 
school maintenance and operation costs (including electricity and telephone bills) 
seem to have been passed on to parents. Such ‘cost-sharing’ has been on the rise as 
public schools were given greater autonomy. While offloading pressure on the 
government budget it most likely has negatively influenced school access and 
performance of children from poor families, as we shall see below. 
As analyzed in Vos and Ponce (2004) and Vos et al. (2003), public spending 
on primary education is strongly pro-poor; spending on secondary education is 
distributed fairly evenly across quintiles of per capita household consumption, while 
spending on university training mainly benefits the richest segments of society. 
Social transfers in education were equivalent to 6.1% of per capita 
consumption, about the same as what households are willing to spend out of their own 
pockets  (table 3).  In 1999, private  expenditures on  education  amounted  to 6.1% of 
TABLE 3 
Public transfers and private expenditures on education as a share of  
household consumption by deciles, 1999 
Deciles Primary  Secondary  Tertiary-Public Tertiary-Private  Total 
Public transfers 
1 17.9%  4.0%  0.0%  0.0%  21.9% 
2 8.9%  4.3%  1.1%  0.0%  14.3% 
3 6.0%  5.7%  1.2%  0.3%  13.1% 
4 5.3%  4.7%  1.5%  0.0%  11.6% 
5 3.4%  4.2%  1.9%  0.1%  9.6% 
6 2.7%  4.0%  1.0%  0.5%  8.1% 
7 1.8%  3.2%  2.7%  0.3%  8.0% 
8 1.2%  2.6%  2.5%  0.8%  7.0% 
9 0.6%  1.3%  2.0%  1.6%  5.5% 
10 0.1%  0.3%  0.9%  1.2%  2.5% 
Total Public  2.0% 2.1%  1.5%  0.8%  6.4% 
Private spending
1
1 3.7%  1.1%  0.0%  4.8% 
2 2.9%  1.4%  0.1%  4.4% 
3 2.7%  1.9%  0.3%  5.0% 
4 2.5%  2.0%  0.4%  4.8% 
5 2.2%  2.0%  0.7%  4.9% 
6 2.3%  2.4%  0.6%  5.3% 
7 2.0%  2.0%  1.1%  5.2% 
8 2.3%  2.5%  1.3%  6.1% 
9 2.2%  2.4%  2.3%  6.9% 
10 2.4%  2.2%  2.4%  7.0% 
Total Private  2.4% 2.2%  1.6%  6.1% 
Source: 1999 LSMS survey. 
Note: 1. Share for ‘Tertiary’ is total for public and private universities. 
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household consumption. This share was 2.4% for primary, 2.2% for secondary and 
1.6% for tertiary education. As one would expect, the richer households spend 
relatively more of their income on education as their children are more likely enrolled 
in private education and stay longer in the system. However, their relative willingness 
to pay for education does not exceed that of poor households by a wide margin. The 
poorest quintile spent about 4.5% on education compared to 7% for the richest 
quintile. As said, the private cost of education have been on the rise due to increasing 
pressure on families to share in the cost of both private and public schooling. In the 
next section we analyze to what extent this is hampering access to schooling and 
could be a problem in achieving the Millennium Development Goal for education. 
 
 
4  COST-EFFECTIVENESS OF EDUCATION SPENDING 
Ecuador has subscribed to the Millennium Development Goal of ensuring 
primary education for all by the year 2015. At unchanged population growth and if 
school enrolment would increase at the same speed as recorded during the 1990s that 
target would not be met. Projected net primary school enrolment would then be 91.7% 
in 2015 and that in secondary and tertiary education would be, respectively, 46.6% 
and 13.3%. Nonetheless, even considering this, ‘business as usual’ is not good enough 
in order to reach the target. Using the Barro-Lee perpetual inventory method to 
translate enrolment rates into years of school attainment, we find that if net school 
enrolment rates for primary, secondary and tertiary education remain unchanged, the 
average number of years of schooling of the population of 12 years and older would 
show a slight drop by the year 2007 (using 2001 as a base year).
7 Should the MDG 
target of 100% net primary school enrolment be achieved, then secondary school 
enrolment would need to increase to 70% (up from 45% in 2001) and retention rates 
would need to increase to 80% (up from 74%) in order to gain one year in the average 
level of education of the working population (assuming tertiary school enrolment 
remains constant). This is with 2007 as time horizon, roughly half-way the MDG 
reference period. Thus, while the net primary school enrolment target may seem 
                                                 
7 See Barro and Lee (2000) for an exposition of the estimation method. Please note that these 
simulations estimate the average level of schooling for the population of 12 years and older. According 
to the 2001 population census data, the average educational level for the population of 12 years and 
older was 7.2 years, against 7.3 years for that of 24 years and older. 
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within reach (at least by 2015, but possibly also by 2007), increasing net secondary 
school enrolment to 70% seems a tall order given the past rates of improvement. But 
the above estimates also suggest that without improving access to higher education 
(currently at a 12% net enrolment rate) it may take a long time to make a substantial 
impact on the average educational level of the work force. Nonetheless, as a working 
hypothesis, we will set enrolment targets at 100% for primary and 70% for secondary 
education and analyze whether it is possible achieve these by making educational 
spending more efficient and/or what additional public investment would be required. 
In order to know by how much the education budget would need to increase or 
how to make that spending more effective to reach the given goals, we need to 
analyze in greater detail the determinants of school enrolment. These determinants 
may be found in the physical accessibility of schools and the quality of school inputs 
(such as availability of textbooks, qualifications of school teachers, and so on). 
However, problems of access to schooling likely are not merely related to factors on 
the supply side, but important constraints are typically also found in the household 
conditions of the children. The education of their parents typically influences the 
decision to attend school, as much as the economic situation of the household. If a 
family is poor and there are significant direct costs to the household for each child 
attending school (school fees, uniforms, educational material, transportation costs), 
parents may decide not to enroll (some of) their children. Such circumstances may 
also lead to a situation where the contribution of children to family income is 
significant (especially in rural areas) and accordingly the opportunity cost associated 
with school attendance may be substantial. Attendance will suffer when parents 
perceive that the return associated with time spent in school does not justify the loss 
of a child’s economic contribution. Also, parents tend to value the quality of 
educational outcomes. That is, if the quality of education is rated to be poor (for 
instance as measured through test scores), parents may be less likely to send their 
children to school. 
We apply a schooling determinants model for Ecuador identifying the 
importance of such factors and quantify the impact of changes in such variables on 
school  outcomes.
8 Our  approach  follows  a  basic  extended  human  capital  model 
                                                 
8 This analysis builds on our earlier work, as presented in Ponce, Bedi and Vos (2003). 
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formulated by Glewwe (1999) and adapted, among others, by Bedi et al. (2004). An 
important advantage of these models as compared to the more traditional ‘willingness-
to-pay models’ is that they include variables of school inputs and educational quality, 
next to demand variables associated with costs and income.
9 In addition to supply side 
variables, our model also considers institutional variables, such as school autonomy 
and decentralized teacher appointments. This dimension is of some importance, as 
discussed below, for the policy design of more cost-effective interventions in 
education. 
 
4.1  Modeling the access to schooling 
We start from a conventional human capital model to understand the main 
factors that determine school enrolment of children.
10 In this theoretical approach 
education is viewed as an investment that depends on the costs and benefits associated 
with enrolment. The costs associated with schooling are direct and indirect. The direct 
costs include inter alia uniforms, books, tuition fees and transportation. Indirect costs 
are defined as the reduction in household income due to the reduction of child labour. 
The expected addition to a child’s human capital and its impact on future earnings are 
among the main benefits associated with schooling. A household will decide to send 
children to school if the (expected) marginal benefit to an additional year of education 
equals the marginal costs. 
This initial theoretical formulation has been extended using dynamic models 
of earnings and the importance of human capital investments (Ben-Porath 1967 and 
Heckman 1976). Specifically for developing countries, Glewwe (1999) has 
formulated an ‘extended human capital model’ to understand government investments 
on school quality and its impact on future earnings. We adopt this model to formulate 
an ‘extended human capital’ model to school enrolment. 
According to this approach, households will maximize the following utility 
function conditional to school enrolment: 
) , ( 1 1 c b U U =   (1) 
                                                 
9 See Gertler and Glewwe (1990) and Gertler and Van der Gaag (1988). 
10 See Schultz (1971) and Becker (1964). 
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where, U is the household utility conditional on school enrolment (denoted by 
subscript 1),   is a vector of benefits associated with attending school, and  is 
household consumption. 
b c
The main benefits associated with schooling, b, are defined by: 
) , , ( z w h B b =   (2) 
where, h is a vector of individual child characteristics, w is a vector of households 
characteristics, and z is a vector of school characteristics (including quality of school 
inputs and institutional aspects). 
The household maximizes utility against the following budget constraint: 
p c y + = 1   (3) 
where  y  is household income, and  p represents the total cost associated with 
enrolment. The utility function associated with not attending school yields: 
) ( 0 0 c U U =   (4) 
The budget constraint is 0 c y = . The household will choose the option associ-
ated with the highest possible utility, i.e.: 
) , max( 0 1
* U U U =   (5) 
where  is the maximum utility. In this case the solution to the maximization 
problem is the probability that an alternative is chosen. 
* U
 
4.2 Empirical  specification 
Three different specifications of the utility function can be found in the 
literature: a linear form (Bedi et al. 2004), a semi-quadratic function (Gertler and 
Glewwe, 1990), and a logarithmic form (Younger et al., 1997). In our case, we decide 
to use a linear form because it is easier to interpret and there is a direct price effect, 
while in the others the price effect is either squared and/or interacted, making 
interpretation difficult.
11 In this case the utility function takes the following form: 
                                                 
11 Results using the quadratic and semi-log specifications, as well as a discussion about the advantages 
and disadvantage of each specification can be found in Ponce, Bedi and Vos (2003). 
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1 1 2 1 1 ε β β + + = c b U   (6) 
whereβ ’s are the coefficients to be estimated and  1 ε  is assumed to be a zero mean, 
normally distributed error term. From equation 3 we see that  p y c − = 1 , the utility 
function can therefore be rewritten as follows: 
1 2 1 1 ) ( ε β β + − + = p y b U   (7) 
The utility function for not being enrolled in school is: 
0 2 0 ε β + = y U   (8) 
Thus, an individual attends school if the utility associated with school 
enrolment is higher than that of not attending. In other words, an individual attends 
school if the following equation is satisfied. 
0 0 1 2 1 > − + − ε ε β β p b   (9) 
The chances of attending school thus can be expressed as a function of socio-
demographic individual and household characteristics, the quality of school inputs and 
the direct and indirect cost of school enrolment. In terms of a linear probability model 
this functional relationship may be written (after using equation 2) as: 
] 0 ) , , ( Pr[ ] 1 Pr[ 2 1 > + − = = a p z w h B a ε β β   (10) 
where a is a binomial variable that takes the value of 1 for enrolment and 0 for non-
enrolment. 
 
4.3 Empirical  results 
Before running the econometric models, we applied several tests to find the 
appropriate model to be estimated. It is clear that people have the following choice 
structure: either not to attend school, attend a public school or attend a private school. 
This choice structure suggests that the appropriate econometric model would be a 
multinomial logistic model (MLM). However, this kind of models assumes the 
  12 
independence of irrelevant alternatives (Greene, 2000).
12 If a subset of the choice set 
is irrelevant with respect to the other alternatives, omitting it from the model will not 
change parameter estimates systematically. Exclusion of these choices will be 
inefficient but will not lead to inconsistency. To confirm the independence of 
irrelevant alternatives a Hausman specification test was carried out. To do that, we 
first run the model using the MLM for the complete set of alternatives, and then we 
run it without the option of being enrolled in a private school. Finally, we run the 
Hausman test to analyze if the difference in estimated coefficients is statistically 
significant or not. The test result is that we cannot reject the null hypothesis. It means 
that there is no evidence that the assumption of independence of irrelevant alternatives 
has been violated. The difference in coefficients is not systematic, implying we can 
use a multinomial logistic model. 
In addition, a Chi-square test was conducted to analyze if we should have two 
different regressions: one for urban and one for rural areas. The test results indicate 
that we should estimate models for urban and rural areas separately. 
Finally, we performed several additional tests to verify if we should use a 
multinomial or a logistic regression. We applied the test for pooling states in the 
multinomial logit model (Cramer and Ridder 1991). In this case, we concluded for the 
urban area that we should use a multinomial model. We reach the same conclusion for 
rural areas.  However, due to the low level of enrolment in private schools in rural 
areas (around 5%) and the low share of private supply in the rural educational service 
delivery, rural children have little choice what type of school to go to. Hence, we 
decided to use a probit model instead of a MLM for rural areas. 
We refer to Ponce, Bedi and Vos (2003) for a more detailed description of the 
quantitative results and estimation procedures. As to data sources, the 1999 Living 
Standards Measurement Study (LSMS) survey is the most recent survey with national 
coverage with sufficient data to fully estimate the demand side variables of our model. 
We merge this data set with quantity and quality data of school inputs using the data 
base of the Ministry of Education (SINEC) for 1999-2000 and the 2000 census of 
teachers and teacher qualifications, also of the ministry. The educational supply data 
                                                 
12 The independence assumption follows from the assumption that the disturbances are independent and 
homoscedastic. It basically means that the relative probabilities of various alternatives remain constant 
regardless of which alternatives are included in the model (Greene 2000: 865). 
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were merged with the household survey data after matching the household location 
identifiers with the location of schools. 
We apply our model to analyze net enrolment determinants for basic and 
secondary education.
13 The detailed empirical estimates for the linear specification are 
given in tables A.1 and A.2.
14 We find that the relative importance of schooling 
determinants varies quite substantially between basic and secondary education, as 
well as that the decision-making behaviour differs for urban and rural and for poor 
and non-poor households.
15 In addition to the variables reported in the annex tables, 
we initially also included the pupil-teacher ratio in the models. Because of a strong 
correlation with the ratio of students per aula and low significance of the pupil-teacher 
ratio, we decided to exclude the latter variable from the model. Similarly, we tried to 
test for the influence of the quality of educational outcomes on the school enrolment 
decision. For this we used test scores for students for both language and mathematics 
at various grade levels. However, test scores are available only at the level of schools 
and not for individual cases of students which can be matched with the household 
survey data. Hence, we used average test scores at the parochial level and merged 
these with the survey data using the geographical location identifier of households.
16 
However, alike in the case of the pupil-teacher ratio, we do not find significant results 
for test scores as a determinant of school enrolment decisions at the primary or 
secondary school level. 
 
4.4  Cost-effectiveness in primary education 
Different behavioural responses of rural and urban, and poor and non-poor 
households to demand and supply factors in primary education can be summarized as 
follows: 
                                                 
13 Under the new schooling system in Ecuador, basic education comprises pre-primary, primary and 
lower secondary education. 
14 Results for quadratic and semi-logarithmic specifications can be obtained from the authors upon 
request. We use elasticities calculated based in the linear specification for budget simulations. Several 
models were used for urban and rural areas, as well for poor and non-poor people. Econometric and 
statistical tests that justify the use of those different models are explained in Ponce, Bedi and Vos 
(2003). 
15 Please note that, as indicated above, for urban areas the demand for schooling model is estimated in 
the form of a multinomial logit specification of household decisions to enroll children in either public 
or private education. In the results presented in the text we only report on the determinants for 
enrolment in public schools. 
16 ‘Parroquías’ (parishes) form the lowest administrative unit in Ecuador’s political-administrative 
system. The parroquías are districts or communities within municipalities (cantons). 
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Schooling determinants in primary education 
Urban Rural   
Poor Non-poor Poor Non-poor 
Demand factors  Cost of education (-)    Cost of education (+)  Cost of education (+) 
z  Education mother (+)    Education mother (+)   
        Gender: Female (+) 
  Location: Quito (+)       
                  Costa (-)  Costa (-)     
Supply factors  Students per class  
room (-) 
  Students per class  
room (-)
 
  Share of trained  
teachers (+) 
Share of trained 
teachers (+) 
  







The relevant elasticities for each of these factors are reported in table 4. On the 
demand side, the direct and indirect costs of education have a weak, but negative 
effect on primary school enrolment, particularly of poor urban households. For each 
1% increase in cost, net enrolment of children from poor urban households is 
expected to fall by  0.2%.  For the total urban sample though the link is much stronger 
 
TABLE 4 
Ecuador: Elasticities of determinants of net enrolment in primary education 
  Urban Rural 
  Total Poor Non-poor Total  Poor Non-poor 
Socio-economic factors 
(demand) 
       
Cost of education    -1.32  -0.19 n.s. 0.06 0.06  0.00002 
Education mother  0.08   0.13 n.s. 0.03  0.06 n.s 
Sex (males =1)  n.s.  n.s.  n.s. n.s.  n.s.  -0.000001 
Quito 0.11  0.04  n.s.         
Costa  n.s.      -0.14  -0.34 n.s. n.s.  n.s. 
Education supply factors         
Students per class 
room  n.s. 0.08  n.s.  n.s. -0.07  n.s. 
Share of trained 
teachers  0.72 n.s.    1.63  n.s. n.s.  n.s. 
Centralized teacher 
appointments    -0.39  n.s.  -0.38  n.s.       -0.03  n.s. 
Source: INEC, Encuesta de Condiciones de Vida (LSMS), 1999 and education input data. Revised estimates from 
Ponce, Bedi and Vos (2003) which estimate same relations for “basic” education, including pre-primary, primary 
and three years of lower secondary education. See Appendix Table A.1 for detailed model estimates. 
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showing a derived elasticity of -1.3.
17 For poor rural households the link is weak, but 
– unexpectedly – positive. It would suggest education is like an inferior good for the 
rural population. In any case the link is weak, such that costs do not seem decisive in 
the determination of rural school enrolment. For both urban and rural poor, the 
education level of the mother has a significant and positive effect on school 
enrolment. Being a boy or a girl hardly influences the primary schooling decision, 
consistent with the observations made earlier about the closing gender gap in 
education in Ecuador. 
On the supply side of primary education, the share of trained teachers has an 
important influence on the decision of school enrolment in urban areas, particularly 
among non-poor households, while for rural households the determinant was not 
found significant. Poor rural households see packed classrooms as a negative sign of 
education quality and are more likely to enroll children in school at a lower ratio of 
pupils per class room. Next to trained teachers, also decentralized appointments of 
teachers (e.g. by parent committees) would influence school enrolment favorably. 
Local teacher appointments reflect greater school autonomy and influence of parents 
in school management. Ecuador has various programs geared at decentralizing 
delivery of public education (see Vos and Ponce 2004, for a further description). 
Based on evaluations of these programs, one may see the decentralized appointment 
of teachers as a proxy of a perception by parents of better delivery of education 
services (or at least a process they can influence), thereby a greater commitment to 
keep children in school and hence a likely positive effect on school enrolment. In the 
model results, this hypothesis is confirmed as reflected by the negative sign for the 
share of teachers that are centrally appointed, i.e. through the Ministry of Education. 
However, when decomposing the sample for poor and non-poor households, this 
variable seems to affect schooling decisions of non-poor urban households most and 
to a lesser extent the poor rural households. 
The education policy implications of these findings would be that: 
                                                 
17 The model results refer to demand for public education. As a larger share of non-poor are enrolled in 
private schools the sample for non-poor in primary schooling age is relatively small, which could 
explain the insignificant estimate for the schooling cost coefficient for this group. The economic 
interpretation could be though that since the non-poor children (or rather their parents) are more likely 
to prefer private schools, the cost of public schools is less likely to influence their decision of 
enrolment. 
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•  It would appear to be more cost-effective to target the cash transfer program 
(Beca Escolar/Bono Desarrollo Humano) towards the urban poor, rather than 
to the rural poor.
18 Of course, given the fact that the cash transfer program is 
conditional upon school assistance, it may nonetheless stimulate primary 
school enrolment in rural areas. For urban areas, the cost-effectiveness model 
would suggest that the subsidy need not be conditional to stimulate school 
enrolment. 
•  Hiring of more trained teachers will positively affect school enrolment in 
urban areas. Given the earlier conclusions about the low quality of education 
as measured through test scores, this may also be a policy priority for rural 
areas. However, according to the cost-effectiveness analysis this measure is 
not expected to raise primary school enrolment among the rural population. 
•  More decentralized decision-making (e.g. assigning greater role of local 
communities in teacher appointments) is expected to promote school 
enrolment, more in particular among urban non-poor and rural poor. 
•  Reducing congestion in classrooms (i.e. ensuring there are sufficient, well-
equipped classrooms for a given student intake) will also positively influence 
school enrolment. While the student-teacher ratio is on average rather 
favorable in Ecuador, infrastructural deficiencies are forcing oversized classes 
and hampering school enrolment and education quality. These problems are 
regionally concentrated. For instance, in some municipal areas (cantons) of the 
provinces Guayas and Los Rios average class sizes are well over 30 and in 
some cases over 40. 
•  As a long run policy, improvement of the level of female education should 
help improve access to primary education. This would require continuous 
efforts in improving school enrolment. In the short run, literacy campaigns 
                                                 
18 In 1998 the unconditional cash transfer program, Bono Solidario, was introduced as a compensatory 
scheme for poor households in response to a reduction of subsidies on the price of cooking gas. In 2003 
this benefit scheme was replaced by a conditional cash transfer program, first labelled as the Beca 
Escolar and subsequently renamed into the Bono de Desarrollo Humano (BDH). Receiving benefits 
from the BDH is conditioned to having children attending primary school and/or mothers and young 
children attending health centres for maternal and child care. Initially, as the Beca Escolar program, the 
cash transfer was only conditioned to school attendance. See Vos, León and Brborich (2001) and 
Parandekar, Vos and Winkler (2002) for a discussion of the eligibility criteria and the effectiveness of 
the Bono Solidario program; and see Vos and Ponce (2004) for a description of the BDH. 
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targeted at mothers with young children in rural areas (where illiteracy rates 
are highest) should be effective in this sense. 
 
4.5  Cost-effectiveness in secondary education 
Similar to primary education, we find important differences in determinants of 
secondary school enrolment decisions across urban and rural and across poor and non-
poor households. The main determinants are found to be the following: 
 




Poor Non-poor Poor  Non-poor 
Demand factors  Cost of education (-)    Cost of education (-)   
  Education mother (+)    Education mother (+)  Education mother(+) 
    Gender: Female (-)  Gender: Female (-)   
  Location: Quito (+)      Location:  Costa (-) 
   Costa  (-)    
Supply factors    Students/class room (-)     
  Share of teachers 
with university degree 
(+)* 
Share of teachers  
with university degree 
(+) 
  Share of trained 
teachers (+) 
Note*  Not significant separately for poor and non-poor, but significant for total sample. 
 
The relevant elasticities are reported in table 5. The direct and indirect costs of 
education have a strong negative effect on secondary school enrolment, particularly 
on that of poor households. For each 1% increase in cost, net enrolment of children 
from poor urban households is expected to fall by 0.4%. For poor rural households the 
implied elasticity is also significant, but lower: -0.2. Among other demand factors, the 
educational level of parents, particularly that of mothers, is an important explanatory 
variable of secondary school enrolment in both urban and rural areas. Girls are not 
found to have a significantly higher or lower probability to access secondary 
education. On the supply side of secondary education, the share of trained teachers 
has an important influence on the decision of school enrolment in urban areas, 
particularly among poor households, while for rural households the determinant was 
only found significant for non-poor households. For each percentage point increase in 
the share of trained teachers, net enrolment among urban poor and rural non-poor is 
expected to rise by about 0.6%. Class size has a significant negative effect on 
secondary schooling decisions of urban non-poor households. 
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TABLE 5  
Ecuador: Elasticities of determinants of net enrolment in secondary education 
  Urban Rural 
  Total Poor  Non-poor Total  Poor  Non-poor 
Socio-economic factors 
(demand) 
       
Cost of education  n.s. -0.399  n.s.  n.s. -0.201 n.s. 
Education mother   0.146  0.358  n.s. 0.635  0.647  0.339 
Sex (males =1)  n.s. n.s.  0.109  0.104 0.191 n.s. 
Quito  n.s. 0.054  n.s.         
Costa n.s.  n.s  n.s. n.s. n.s.  -0.101 
Education supply factors          
Students per class 
room  -0.236  n.s      -0.032  n.s  n.s  n.s 
Share of trained 
teachers  n.s n.s  n.s  n.s  n.s  0.641 
Share of teachers with 
university degree  0.382 n.s  n.s  n.s  n.s  n.s 
Centralized teacher 
appointments  n.s n.s  n.s  n.s  n.s  n.s 
Source: Ponce, Bedi and Vos (2003: table 6.14). See appendix table A.2 for detailed model estimates. 
 
The education policy implications of these findings would be as follows: 
•  It would be cost-effective to increase the coverage of the Beca Escolar 
(presently, Bono de Desarrollo Humano) program to poor households with 
children in the age group of 12-18 year olds. Particularly, in rural areas such 
policy (or any other measure reducing education cost to households) would be 
essential to enhance access of the poor to secondary education. 
•  Enhancing the share of teachers with a university degree seems critical to 
increase enrolment in urban areas and that of trained teachers (with 
pedagogical diploma) to positively influence enrolment decisions of non-poor 
households in rural areas. 
•  Class size per se, is not a major problem of access, except for certain urban 
areas where too large class sizes and insufficient schooling infrastructure 
seems to hamper enrolment.
19 
•  As a long run policy, improvement of the level of female education should 
help improve access to secondary education. This would require continuous 
efforts in improving school enrolment in both primary and secondary 
                                                 
19 As reported in Ponce, Bedi and Vos (2003), this is not merely a problem in urban public secondary 
schools. The same problem is found for enrolment in private schools. 
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education. In the short run, literacy campaigns targeted at mothers with young 
children in rural areas could be effective in this sense. 
 
 
5  BUDGET IMPLICATIONS OF TRYING TO ACHIEVE EDUCATION 
TARGETS 
Ecuador’s government budget system long has been highly centralized, rule 
oriented and input based. The education budget forms a prime example. The input-
based characteristic has led to incremental allocations (in nominal terms) according to 
cost changes of main education supply components. The wage bill has been in 
practice the centerpiece of education budget adjustments as rising student numbers 
were responded by hiring of new teachers, while teacher salaries mainly have 
increased in response to teacher union demands. In a way such adjustment is logical 
as teachers do form the main input of educational services anywhere. Government 
budget rules in Ecuador ever since the 1970s have included a host of fixed allocations 
from specified revenues (including the repartition of oil revenues) and fixed-share or 
growth rules, such as the rule that education should receive at least 30% of the 
government expenditures, whereas growth of health expenditures are not allowed to 
drop below the overall growth of public expenditures. Even though such rules have 
not been faithfully adhered to in practice and have not been able to prevent real 
education expenditures to fall for a prolonged period of time, they have imposed 
obvious rigidities in the spending pattern. Education expenditures have been capped 
by the 30%-rule, albeit a ceiling which would move pro-cyclically with aggregate 
government expenditures. The wage bill would typically eat into incremental changes, 
but leaving infrastructure and maintenance as the first item to accommodate 
downward budget adjustments when required. The highly centralized system of 
budget controls and personnel management distanced resource allocation further away 
from performance orientation.
20
As discussed in the above, the Ecuadorian government has been making 
several efforts to move towards a more performance-oriented budgeting system in 
education trying to enhance efficiency and equity in education outcomes. The demand  
                                                 
20 See Reid (1997) for a further analysis of this point and incentives to circumvent budget rules and 
control through off-budget activities and other devices. 
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subsidies provided through the Beca Escolar/Bono Desarrollo Humano should 
improve access to education for the poor. Greater autonomy for decentralized 
networks of schools should also help a more effective spending of resources, while a 
new formula for allocating the central education budget across provinces is expected 
to yield greater equity. However, it cannot be denied that these steps far from 
constitute a sufficient move towards a more transparent and coherent result-oriented 
budgeting system. First, the Beca Escolar is managed separate from the education 
budget as a social protection program. Second, the budgets in support of a more 
decentralized implementation of education policies (such as the Redes Amigas 
project) have been heavily dependent on external resources and managed as off-
budget activities.
21
A first step towards a more comprehensive result-oriented budgeting system 
would be to put together all programs and interventions aiming at improving 
educational outcomes and monitor each for their cost-effectiveness. In line with the 
MDGs, increased access to primary and secondary education is a priority target for 
the Ecuadorian government. In that vein, the results of the schooling determinants 
model of Section 4 may serve as a starting point for the development of a result-
oriented expenditure tracking methodology. 
The schooling determinants model serves to establish input-output 
relationships in education, i.e. between policy interventions and expected educational 
outcomes measured by net enrolment rates. The relative importance of each 
determinant discussed in Section 4 may be expressed as elasticities expressing the 
impact of a 1% change of a given determinant on school enrolment (see tables 4 and 
5). After linking these to unit costs we obtain a basis for making budget projections 
for alternative resource allocations. 
As a first approximation we perform static cost-effectiveness simulations, that 
is, we change effective inputs such that we approach a given target (say, 100% net 
enrolment) using the given elasticities and unit cost to estimate the costs of the 
interventions. In this exercise we do take account of certain interaction effects. For 
instance, an expansion of the conditional cash transfer program would  lead  to  higher 
                                                 
21 Redes Amigas is an IDB-funded educative program that aims to improve the quality of education in 
rural areas based on a decentralization strategy (transferring budgets from the provincial unit of the 
Ministry of Education to schools). 
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school enrolment, but also to a higher number of students per class room which has a 
negative effect on enrolment for some groups of the population in school-going age 
unless more is invested in class rooms. In the results reported below, we assume that 
the pupil-teacher ratio is kept fixed during the simulation period. Simulations are 
compared to a baseline scenario which keeps all inputs constant (although the number 
of teachers may rise as a result of the fixed pupil-teacher ratio assumption) and unit 
costs adjust for projected inflation only. In the baseline (no policy change), the 
primary education budget remains at 1.3% of GDP and that for secondary education at 
1.2% of GDP, while net enrolment rates do not improve from 2003 levels. 
 
5.1  Budget tracking and projections for primary education 
Table 6 shows three budget scenarios. First, we increase the shares of trained teachers 
to 100% (up from 90% in 2003) and reduce the share of teachers with central 
appointment to 84% (down from 94%) by 2007. This scenario works to get all urban 
non-poor children in school by 2007 and would have induced urban poor to a net 
enrolment rate of 97% (up from 89% in 2003). The policy should also help to increase 
enrolment among the rural poor, but without additional investment in rural school 
infrastructure the effect will be more than offset by the ensuing increase in the number 
of pupils per class room. The budget implications of this policy are minimal. All other 
things being equal, it would require an increase of about 7% of the (nominal) 
education budget by 2007 or about US$ 30 million as compared to a baseline of no 
policy change. This policy can be as effective, but even cost-saving if we would drop 
the assumption of a fixed pupil-teacher ratio of 23 and allow the ratio to increase to 25 
and implying a reduction of the number of teachers by 3% (or about 3,700 teachers). 
Second, we expand the Beca Escolar program to cover all urban poor. The 
analysis of Section 4 suggests school subsidies (or reducing schooling costs) only 
significantly influence enrolment for this population group. As this group was not 
targeted initially by the Beca Escolar program, this would involve additional 
budgetary cost; not just of the increase in coverage of the cash transfer program, but 
also due to rising teacher costs as enrolment increases and the pupil-teacher ratio is 
kept fixed. In order to have all urban poor in school by 2007, this would involve a 
slightly smaller additional budget effort of 6% over the baseline projection by 2007 or 
about US$ 28 million (0.1% of GDP). The additional cost may be ‘financed’ through 
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cost saving by allowing for a slight increase in the pupil-teacher ratio to the same tune 
as in the first simulation. 
 
TABLE 6 
Reaching the MDG for education: 
Static budget projections for primary education, 2003-7 
   Increase trained teachers  Increase school subsidy 
program 
Combined: trained teachers, 
school subsidies and rural 
school infrastructure 
 Additional 




costs as % 
GDP 
Additional 




costs as % 
GDP 
Additional 




costs as % 
GDP 
2004 4.1%  0.1%  3.5% 0.0%  6.1%  0.1% 
2005 5.4%  0.1%  4.0% 0.1%  9.0%  0.1% 
2006 6.2%  0.1%  4.8% 0.1%  12.1%  0.2% 
2007 7.1%  0.1%  6.2% 0.1%  14.6%  0.2% 
  Increase trained teachers  Increase school subsidy 
program 
Combined: trained teachers, 
school subsidies and rural 
school infrastructure 
Additional budget requirements (in mln US$) 
2003 0  0  0 
2004 16  14  24 
2005 22  16  37 
2006 27  21  52 
2007 32  28  65 
Total 2003-2007  97 78  177 
Net enrolment rate by 2007 
Urban poor  0.97  1.00  1.00 
Urban non-poor  1.00  0.94  1.00 
Rural poor  0.87  0.86  0.88 
Rural non-poor  0.93  0.93  0.93 
Nation-wide  0.94 0.93  0.95 
Urban total  0.99 0.97  1.00 
Rural total  0.88 0.88  0.89 
Source: Juan Ponce and Rob Vos (2004) Budget projections model for Ecuador’s education sector (spreadsheet 
model). See text for explanation of the budget simulations procedure. 
 
Third, we combine the two policies and also allow for an increase in rural 
school infrastructure by a sufficient amount such that the rise in the number of pupils 
per class room does not have a negative effect on enrolment of the rural poor. Given 
our model parameters and all other things being equal, we expect this combination of 
policies to lead to universal access to education for the urban population, but leave the 
rural population without any visible benefit. The cost would only be marginally higher 
than for the second budget scenario (additional annual cost of 0.2% of GDP or about 
US$ 4 – 5 in per capita terms), mainly due to the extra investment in schooling 
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infrastructure and the rise in demand for teachers as enrolment increases.
22 Again, this 
policy package could be financed by allowing for a gradual increase in the pupil-
teacher ratio to 27.5 by 2007, but requiring reduction of about 9% of the current 
number of teachers (i.e. affecting about 11,000 teachers). 
 
TABLE 7 
Improving access to secondary education: 
Static budget projections for secondary education, 2003-7 
   Increase trained teachers  Increase school subsidy 
program 
Combined: trained teachers, 
school subsidies and rural 
school infrastructure 
 Additional 




costs as % 
GDP 
Additional 




costs as % 
GDP 
Additional 




costs as % 
GDP 
2004 2.4%  0.0%  3.1% 0.0%  13.1%  0.2% 
2005 4.8%  0.1%  5.0% 0.1%  22.6%  0.3% 
2006 7.0%  0.1%  8.1% 0.1%  38.2%  0.4% 
2007 8.8%  0.1%  11.9% 0.1%  53.3%  0.6% 
  Increase trained teachers  Increase school subsidy program Combined: trained teachers, 
school subsidies and rural 
school infrastructure 
Additional budget requirements (in mln US$) 
2003 0  0  6 
2004 8  11  46 
2005 17  18  83 
2006 27  31  146 
2007 35  47  212 
Total 2003-2007  88 108  493 
Net enrolment rate by 2007 
Urban poor  0.57  0.70  0.70 
Urban non-poor  0.83  0.76  0.79 
Rural poor  0.24  0.27  0.27 
Rural non-poor  0.60  0.52  0.55 
Nation-wide  0.56 0.58  0.59 
Urban total  0.71 0.73  0.75 
Rural total  0.32 0.33  0.34 
Source: Juan Ponce and Rob Vos (2004) Budget projections model for Ecuador’s education sector (spreadsheet 
model). See text for explanation of the budget simulations procedure. 
 
5.2  Budget tracking and projections for secondary education 
Using the cost-effectiveness analysis as a basic input, table 7 shows three 
budget scenarios for trying to make an important step towards reaching the target of 
70% of net secondary enrolment by 2007. First, we increase the shares of secondary 
                                                 
22 The additional costs amount to US$ 12 to 16 per student. 
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school teachers with a university degree and with a pedagogical degree to 100% (up 
from about 80% in 2003). This scenario would stimulate enrolment in urban areas and 
reach the target, except that it would mainly stimulate enrolment for the urban non-
poor, leaving the urban poor still at some distance of the target of 70% net enrolment. 
The simulation would also predict enrolment of rural non-poor to be up at 60% by 
2007 (from 52% in 2003). The rural poor are not expected to be induced to higher 
enrolment by such a policy. The policy would imply though that some 27,000 teachers 
in secondary schools would have to be trained or receive a university degree in a four 
year time span, which might be a steep order and may have to be spread out over a 
longer period. We estimate the extra budgetary cost at an annual US$ 35 million by 
2007 or an increase of about 8% from the baseline budget for secondary education 
equivalent to 0.1% of GDP. The policy could also be made budget neutral, with the 
same expected effect on enrolment, by letting the pupil-teacher ratio in secondary 
education increase from 13 to15 between 2003 and 2007. In this case to total number 
of secondary school teachers could remain about constant at 2003 levels, but still 
about 15,000 would need to be trained or get a university degree. 
Second, we expand the Beca Escolar program to cover all urban and rural poor 
household with children (potentially) in secondary school. The analysis of section 4 
suggests school subsidies (or reducing schooling costs) will significantly influence 
enrolment for the poor households. As the Beca Escolar program has not been 
targeted originally at secondary education, this would involve additional budgetary 
cost; not just of the increase in coverage of the cash transfer program, but also due to 
rising teacher costs as enrolment increases and the pupil-teacher ratio is kept fixed. 
Under the given assumptions, the policy could work to reach the 70% target for the 
urban poor. However, secondary school enrolment for the rural poor is so low and the 
impact of the subsidy (of US$ 5 per student per month) is not large enough to increase 
enrolment massively for this population group. As discussed in section 4, increasing 
access for the rural poor to secondary education has to be part of a long-term effort of 
which targeted subsidies are at best only one element, but would further require 
improving the general economic conditions of rural households (requiring less child 
labour), improved achievement at the primary education level and improvements over 
time of parents education (especially of mothers). The additional budgetary cost of the 
school subsidy program as simulated would amount to 12% over the baseline 
projection or about US$ 47 million (0.14% of GDP) by 2007. To finance the 
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expansion of the Beca Escolar through a reduction of the teacher wage bill (as 
compared to the baseline scenario) the pupil-teacher ratio would have to increase to 
15.3 by 2007. 
Third, we combine the two policies and also allow for an increase in school 
infrastructure by a sufficient amount such that class size (pupils per class room) 
remains at 21 and therefore will not impact negatively on urban enrolment (see cost-
effectiveness analysis). In this scenario we limit the increase in the share of teachers 
with a degree to 89%, implying about 9,700 teachers would have to be trained during 
the period. Given our model parameters and all other things being equal, we expect 
this combination of policies to lead to reach the 70% target for both urban poor and 
non-poor, but the rural poor would still fall short of this target for the reasons 
mentioned above. The additional infrastructure investment would, however, be 
substantial in this scenario creating an additional cost of around US$ 212 million by 
2007.
23 During 2003-7 about 4,000 new class rooms would have to be constructed to 
keep the class size at 21. The extra cost would require the secondary education budget 
to increase by about 50%, an annual cost equivalent to 0.6% of GDP. It would thus 
also involve a much steeper increase in the pupil-teacher ratio (from 13 to about 18) if 
the policy is to be budget neutral. However, this would imply having to reduce the 
total number of secondary school teachers by 10,000 (12% of the current number) 
between 2003 and 2007, likely a tall order politically speaking and with uncertain 
effects on education quality. 
In sum, there exist (financially) feasible scenarios to reach 100% of net 
primary school enrolment in urban areas in the medium run. Such a target may be 
reached without additional budget effort, if the additional cost of increasing the 
quality of teachers and increased coverage of demand subsidies is compensated by a 
slight reduction in the excess of the total number of teachers. Meeting the target for 
the rural population seems for complicated and the budget implications could not be 
quantified based on the cost-effectiveness model. In secondary education, important 
progress can be made to reach a target of 70% net enrolment (with important expected 
positive externalities for economic growth), again by enhancing the share of trained 
teachers,  expand  coverage  of  school  demand  subsidies  and  improve  class   infra- 
                                                 
23 This is about US$ 17 in per capita terms and about US$ 55 per secondary school student. 
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structure. Again, the target is within reach for the poor and non-poor urban population 
by 2007 at a possible additional cost of between 0.1 and 0.6% of GDP, whether 
concentrating on just targeted demand subsidies or on a combined improvement in 
teacher quality, demand subsidy coverage and availability of school infrastructure. 
The latter option would also have a visible impact on secondary school enrolment in 
rural areas, but still far off target given the extremely low initial levels of schooling 
access in those parts of the country. Reaching the 70% target for the rural population 
will require a much longer time period. The required extra budget costs for enhanced 
secondary school enrolment are thus much more substantial than in the case of 
primary education. Again, however, one could consider adjusting upward the 
currently very favourable pupil-teacher ratio to free up resources for the more cost-
effective budget allocation, but in doing so one has to consider the political and social 
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APPENDICES 
TABLE A.1 
Ecuador: Cost-effectiveness model estimates for net enrolment in primary education 
Urban area (linear multinominal logit specification) 
   Poor Non-poor 
  Coefficient ey/ex Significance  Coefficient ey/ex Significance 
Public primary schools           
Education costs  -0.000027  -0.1917  0.0000  -0.000001  -2.5837  0.7130 
Sex -0.5967  0.0114  0.2160  -0.3778  -0.0749  0.3980 
Age 2.2607  -0.3932  0.1510  -0.7220  2.7793  0.4450 
Age squared  -0.1155  0.2491  0.2460  0.0569  -1.1970  0.2630 
Education level father  -0.0941  -0.1189  0.1270  -0.0618  -0.5482  0.4080 
Education level mother  0.3205  0.1282  0.0000  0.1544  -0.2880  0.2100 
Location: Quito = 1  1.0787  0.0366  0.0320  1.1219  0.1464  0.1580 
                Region (Costa =1)  -1.1744  -0.1365  0.0580  3.9791  -0.3372  0.0020 
Students per class room  0.1237  0.1130  0.0180  -0.0106  -0.7235  0.9350 
% teachers with pedagogical title  6.0027  0.0806  0.0290  17.8841  1.6331  0.0000 
% teachers with university de-
gree  -0.5159 0.0190  0.8410  -14.9457 -0.3393  0.0000 
% teachers appointed by Min. of 
Educ. -0.7781  -0.1414  0.7480  -13.6122  -0.3799  0.0000 
Constant -15.1981    0.0330  0.0907    0.9880 
                 
Private primary schools                
Education costs  0.0000  1.3234  0.0010  0.0000  0.7400  0.0000 
Sex -0.9755  -0.1890  0.0210  -0.2050  0.0207  0.6650 
Age 3.3550  8.9130  0.0010  -1.1540  -0.8189  0.2700 
Age squared  -0.1804  -4.6386  0.0070  0.0785  0.3583  0.1700 
Education level father  0.0442  0.8302  0.5750  0.0033  0.1547  0.9670 
Education level mother  0.2249  -0.4937  0.0250  0.1910  0.0884  0.0770 
Location: Quito = 1  -0.3555  -0.2506  0.5340  0.2714  -0.0411  0.7480 
                Region (Costa =1)  0.6222  0.9598  0.4920  4.7639  0.1050  0.0000 
Students per class room  0.1235  0.1054  0.0370  0.0208  0.2062  0.8740 
% teachers with pedagogical title  6.8636  0.8397  0.0110  15.5642  -0.4099  0.0010 
% teachers with university de-
gree  -0.9919 -0.2450  0.7280  -14.2165  0.0665  0.0030 
% teachers appointed by Min. of 
Educ. 3.5209  1.1420  0.2750  -12.0046  0.0941  0.0010 
Constant -25.9500    0.0000  -1.1238    0.8740 
 
Rural area (linear probit specification) 
   Poor Non-poor 
   dF/dx Significance  dF/dx  Significance 
Education costs  0.0600  0.0000  0.000018  0.0000 
Sex 0.0064  0.3610  -0.000001  0.0310 
Age 1.5210  0.0000  0.000069  0.0260 
Age squared  -0.6908  0.0020  -0.000033  0.0290 
Education level mother  0.0618  0.0000  0.0000000  0.9860 
Region -0.0097  0.2990  -0.000001  0.4490 
Indigenous 0.0069  0.1620  0.000000  0.4080 
Distance to school (minutes)  0.0294  0.0000  0.000000  0.6500 
Students per class room   -0.0726  0.0110  0.000001  0.7310 
% teachers with pedagogical title  0.0130  0.8400  0.000006  0.5270 
% teachers with university degree  0.0027  0.8800  0.000001  0.4390 
% teachers appointed by Min. of Educ. -0.0333  0.0980  0.000001  0.3220 
Source: Model estimations based on 1999 LSMS survey. See text for model specifications. 
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TABLE A.2 
Ecuador: Cost-effectiveness model estimates for net enrolment in secondary education 
Urban area (linear multinominal logit specification) 
   Poor Non-poor 
Public secondary school  Coefficient ey/ex  Significance  Coefficient ey/ex Significance 
Cost of education  -0.000019  -0.3985  0.0000  0.000000  -0.8523  0.9340 
Sex -0.2796  -0.0290  0.3970  0.9066  0.1090  0.0180 
Age 0.2487  -3.2119  0.9210  -1.7310  -5.4009  0.3420 
Age squared  -0.0172  1.2286  0.8390  0.0418  2.4139  0.4910 
Education level father  0.0045  -0.0218  0.9340  -0.0325  -0.2375  0.4610 
Education level mother  0.1979  0.3577  0.0000  0.0470  -0.1493  0.4090 
Location: Quito=1  1.2882  0.0542  0.0020  0.1468  -0.1099  0.7280 
                 Region=1  0.0726  0.0356  0.8970  0.1988  -0.1817  0.5740 
Students per class room  -0.0236  -0.1924  0.1740  -0.0318  -0.2183  0.0420 
% teachers with 
pedagogical title  1.9620 0.3597  0.1770  0.1903  0.1735  0.9140 
% teachers with university 
degree  2.4618 0.4110  0.1930  3.3823  0.3263  0.3070 
% teachers appointed by 
MoE  -0.3782 -0.0406  0.6450  -0.4420  -0.4606  0.6670 
constant -1.2675    0.9460  15.8299    0.2360 
Private secondary school                
Cost of education  0.0000  1.4028  0.0970  0.0000  1.1235  0.0000 
Sex -0.5317  -0.1644  0.1420  0.5234  -0.0756  0.0330 
Age 6.4239  88.6001  0.0060  -1.1477  3.1634  0.4510 
Age squared  -0.2314  -46.6608  0.0030  0.0227  -1.7566  0.6620 
Education level father  0.1081  0.6119  0.2910  0.0141  0.2577  0.7160 
Education level mother  -0.0512  -1.1985  0.5000  0.0886  0.2679  0.1230 
Location: Quito=1  -1.4118  -0.2939  0.1040  1.2810  0.1491  0.0090 
                Region=1  -0.7381  -0.5100  0.3180  1.0006  0.2544  0.1010 
Students per class room  -0.0235  -0.1897  0.4170  -0.0223  0.1143  0.4110 
% teachers with 
pedagogical title  1.6887 0.1507  0.4160  -0.3030  -0.2046  0.8900 
% teachers with university 
degree  4.3349 1.9768  0.2020  3.0135  0.0136  0.4170 
% teachers appointed by 
MoE  -0.1866 0.0397  0.8960  2.1059  0.5753  0.0590 
constant  -49.2689     0.0100  7.2154     0.5190 
 
 
Rural area (linear probit specification) 
   Poor Non-poor 
   eF/ex P>|z|  eF/ex  P>|z| 
Cost of education  -0.2014  0.0960  0.084431  0.1410 
Sex 0.1912  0.0170  0.006152  0.9040 
Age 3.5508  0.7250  8.096060  0.3340 
Age squared  -2.5069  0.6260  -4.157873  0.3210 
Education level mother  0.6467  0.0000  0.3386719  0.0000 
Region -0.0057  0.9440  -0.100778  0.0520 
Distance to school (minutes)  -0.0182  0.8970  0.016891  0.8190 
Students per class room  -0.0814  0.6840  0.142810  0.1560 
Students per aula  -0.1882  0.7550  0.641201  0.0140 
% teachers with pedagogical title  0.1772 0.4730  -0.158695  0.4740 
% teachers with university degree  -0.2770 0.2540  0.054971  0.6720 
Source: Model estimations based on 1999 LSMS survey. See text for model specifications. 
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